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Abstract 
Sustainable use of sloping lands and watersheds requires ways to link downstream 
effects (negative or positive) to the decisions made upstream. The concept of 
‘payments for environmental services’ and the use of market-based institutions 
for such is gaining ground. In this paper we will review the conceptual basis of 
such mechanisms and the existing array of institutional innovations in both 
insular and mainland Southeast Asia. Markets are by definition realistic, voluntary 
and conditional. Their effects on poverty are mixed. Many environmental issues 
and the increasing scarcity of ecosystem services are linked to ‘market failure’. Ti-
me-lags, complex cause-effect and multiple layers of rights and responsibilities of 
environmental issues make ‘service’ considerations externalities of decision 
making processes that are focussed on ‘marketable goods’. Which combination of 
characteristics, short of full markets, is needed for effective, efficient, sustainable 
and equitable mechanisms to avoid environmental degradation beyond thresholds 
of sustainability? Are pro-poor market-based mechanisms possible? We set out to 
identify mutually beneficial opportunities for ‘modifiers’ and ‘beneficiaries’ of 
environmental services to interact as an alternative to a purely regulatory 
approach to environmental issues. The domain for voluntary, conditional rewards 
for environmental services (ES)  is constrained by existing regulations and the 
rights it specifies to a share in the available ES (including the ES of buffering 
against pollution or the transfer of rainfall to usable water flows). We combined 
principles and insights from social welfare theory (development and en-
vironmental economics and project appraisal), institutional economics (principal 
agent problems, game theory) and integrated natural resource management 
approaches with emerging experience in action research sites and pilot 
application schemes to obtain a general framework of criteria and indicators, a 
consistent terminology and to clarify the multiple pathways (8 identified so far) 
and challenges of poverty reduction through reward and compensation mecha-
nisms. Two main classes and four main criteria were formulated. The first class 
relates to the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CRES 
institutions, with the environmental services as the primary target and criteria 
that relate to three questions (Would rewards be realistic? Will they be 
voluntary? What conditionality will apply?) that predominate in the scoping, 
stakeholder analysis and negotiation + implementation stages, respectively). 
The second class is aimed at the equity dimension with also three main 
questions (Is poverty linked to ES issues? Who is/will be excluded? Are the 
rewards ‘pro-poor’?) for the three stages.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last year of its first phase, the RUPES (Rewarding Upland Poor for the 
Environmental Services they provide)  project  financially supported by International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and implemented by the World 
Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) together with a range of international and national 
partners is reaching a phase of reflection and self-evaluation. While we have learnt a 
lot, both in theory and in practice, we need to  look beyond the traditional project  
input – output / outcome /impact  relationships, to a full cycle learning from the 
framing of the problem, through internal capacity building to outputs, uptake and 
policy follow-through (on the way to outcomes and impacts). Because RUPES 
operates at site, national and international level, we need to see how the three learning 
cycles have influenced each other. While the full evaluation is under way, this paper 
aims at drawing some lessons as steps towards the next learning cycle (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Learning cycle as articulated for the self-evaluation of the RUPES project at 
site, national and international level 
 
Impact studies in the domain of Integrated Natural Resource Management, of which 
RUPES is a part, has to consider the multiple layers of ‘management’: the farmers 
trying to manage their agro-ecosystem, the local community trying to manage/in-
fluence what individual farmers (or farm households) do, the government (on behalf 
of downstream interest groups) trying to manage/influence what the communities are 
doing, and international stakeholders trying to manage/influence the way all these 
other layers interact. As we deal with multiple objectives, evaluate the performance of 
the agroecosystem through multiple lenses and have access to different arrays of 
options and knowledge about past performance, it is not usually possible to extract 
Impact
Upta-
ke
Fra-
ming Activi-
ties
Outputs
Issues
Inputs
Outcomes
 3
simple causative ‘impact pathways’. However, we can certainly document and try to 
quantify the degrees of learning that take place. In reviewing the level of ‘learning’ of 
managers, we can distinguish five layers, based on an understanding of what 
managers do (van Noordwijk et al., 2001; Fig. 2).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Five levels of understanding that managers need in order to do their job 
(van Noordwijk et al., 2001) 
 
First of all –managers need to know whether or not there is a contrast between the 
current performance of the system and existing objectives. If not, they can focus 
on other issues; if yes, they may need to reconsider the management objectives but 
if these are confirmed as being reasonable, they need to look for new options or 
better ways of allocating their scarce resources over the existing options. 
Secondly, they may need to have new options, by true innovation or by access to 
innovations elsewhere.  
Thirdly, they have to learn by doing and adjust their expectations of the utility of the 
various options that exist. 
Fourthly, allocation of scarce resources over the various options is in some way 
related to the expected utility of these options with respect to the various 
objectives (usually involving tradeoffs, as one normally can't reach all to the 
maximum extent) -- but maybe there are better ways of allocating these resources.  
Fifthly, assuming that there is no implementation gap and one actually does what was 
planned, one has to realize that the system is not only responding to the 
management inputs, but also to factors outside of the managers control; in learning 
from the actual system performance, one needs to acknowledge these outside 
forces based on a conceptual model of ‘how the system works’. 
In the conceptualization of RUPES we deal with at least three managers: the upland 
communities who are modifying environmental services and may become ‘sellers’, 
the downstream communities who benefit from these services and who may become 
‘buyers’, and a group of intermediaries/brokers who try to bridge between ‘supply’ 
and ‘demand’. As RUPES belongs to the broker category, our learning is closely 
linked to the learning of the two other groups. 
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Figure 3. Conceptual representation of the relationship between ‘upland’ modifiers of 
environmental stocks and flows (often as an ‘externality’ of current livelihood 
strategies) and downstream beneficiaries who perceive changes in environmental stocks 
and flows as changes ‘environmental services’ and may try to influence upland decision 
makers by appropriate mix of recognition and rewards, when a pure regulatory approach 
to ‘control’ them doesn’t work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The network of RUPES action research sites in Asia 
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In the rest of this paper we will present some emerging highlights on four aspects 
from the following: 
• International level learning 
• Learning in National Policy Networks 
• Learning at site level 
2. International level learning 
2.1 Boundary organizations 
The concept of ‘boundary organizations’ has emerged over the past decade in the 
context of efforts to more closely link ‘knowledge to action’ or ‘action to knowledge’, 
depending on ones perspective (Fig. 5). Large international assessment efforts, such 
as the Inter-government Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) have been both the stimulus and the initial targets of 
the learning on what boundary organizations are, do, can be and can do. 
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Figure 5A. By building bridges between the 
formal learning in knowledge systems and the 
learning by doing of action institutions, boundary 
organizations can contribute to current issues as 
well as try to be ‘ahead of the curve’ for future 
ones; B.  Typology of boundary organizations on 
the interface of knowledge and action, with 
examples of six classes of boundary work  
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At a recent workshop at the University of Arizona, a typology of boundary 
organizations was developed and widely accepted, that is based on a 0, 1 and ≥2 
classification of actors and ways of knowing (Fig 5B). It leads to 6 classes of 
boundary spanning activities: 
 
0. A Ù A, no K 
I.  K Ù K, no A 
II.  K Ù A – the archetypal boundary work of technology transfer, science-> policy 
advice, public funding for science and decision support 
systems; the IPCC effort falls within this class with its 
‘policy relevant’ but not ‘prescriptive’ synthesis of science  
III. K Ù (A Ù A)  -- boundary work such as ‘joint fact finding’ that cam emerge at a 
certain stage in (mediated) political negotiations 
IV. (K Ù K) Ù A – integrated assessments, such as the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA) 
V. (K Ù K) Ù (A Ù A) – negotiation support systems and the emerging reward 
mechanisms for environmental systems, where both the 
articulation of knowledge and the actions are negotiated 
 
Based on the initial experience of the RUPES Phase I project, the emergence of 
effective mechanisms for environmental service rewards, falls into the most complica-
ted (and rich) class of boundary work, class V, that has to acknowledge multiple ways 
of knowing and multiple actors and find effective bridges across. 
2.2 Realistic, voluntary, conditional ES reward schemes designed to be 
pro-poor  
The experience so far in RUPES Phase 1 has helped in identifying four dimensions 
that differentiate existing attempts to enhance environmental services by contracts that 
provide positive incentives for guardianship (avoiding damage) and stewardship 
(restoration): 
Realistic – or aligned with the opportunities, opportunity costs and trade-offs that 
constrain the decisions of the upstream and downstream actors, linked to their 
preferences  
Voluntary – complementing existing regulation and providing ‘additionality’ from 
the downstream perspective and bridging collective and individual action at the 
upstream side, alleviating the most constraining livelihood concern 
Conditional – with clarity on performance and evaluation criteria in a contractual 
sense; conditionality can be a mix of 5 levels (Figure 4) 
Pro-poor – acknowledging the distributional impact of rewards on resource-poor 
local stakeholders and selecting mechanisms that enhance equity 
 
The ultimate combination of realistic, voluntary and conditional may be called a 
‘market’, but many of the current environmental issues derive from ‘market failure’, 
and further analysis of these failures is needed before we can expect constrained mar-
kets to provide sustainable, effective and efficient solutions. The inherent innovations 
of ‘means’ to achieve ‘ends’ that a market-based paradigm can bring, however, are 
needed to overcome the rigidity that most regulation-based solutions to issue cycles 
entail. 
 A set of more detailed criteria and indicators has been developed for each of 
these 4 dimensions has been developed and used for characterization of and learning 
from the experience in the RUPES action and associated learning sites, as well as a 
broader list of efforts in the sphere of ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES). 
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The four dimensions have distinctive consequences for the role of intermediaries/ bro-
kers in the emergence of location specific reward mechanisms 
 
3. Learning in National Policy Networks 
3.1 Issue cycle: regulation or incentive based outcomes  
A further building block of current thinking is the ‘issue cycle’ that has been recog-
nized as underlying many issues that become of public concern and that have to rise 
from a stage of ‘denial’ towards recognition as issue and then onwards to attempts at 
solutions (through mitigation, adaptation or reduction of ‘root’ causes) that have 
sufficient political support and that usually involve both ‘regulatory’ and ‘voluntary’ 
mechanisms (Tomich et al., 2004a; Fig.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Issue cycle underlying the public recognition and solution of contrasts between 
reality and desirable states of the human and human + ecological system 
 
The abstraction of an ‘issue cycle’ is a simplification of what often is a ‘spiral’ (i.e. a 
cycle that progresses along a third axis, either contracting or expanding), or multiple 
intertwined spirals. 
  
One of the key lessons of RUPES Phase 1 is that the emergence of ‘voluntary' reward 
mechanisms for ES provided by upland poor is strongly constrained by existing 
regulations, that often classify upland poor as illegal occupants of a domain that is 
supposed to provide ES as public good to ‘downstream’ society. The concept of 
‘downstream’ is literal in terms of watershed functions, and a metaphor for biodiver-
sity conservation and carbon storage. Finding solutions that work locally in the stages 
at which local issue cycles on poverty and environmental issues are, is often con-
strained by the ‘solutions’ that have emerged from national level issue cycles. Often 
these ‘solutions’ pose new ‘problems’, in the form of administrative and compliance 
hurdles. 
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Figure 7. The relationship between the regulatory approach to ‘minimum acceptable 
behaviour’ and the domain for voluntary environmental service provision; CES =  
(obligatory) compensation for damage to ES; RES = reward for voluntary enhancement 
 
More specifically, the experience in both the Philippines and Indonesia has shown that 
existing regulations have many interfaces with the reconciliation of rural poverty and 
enhancement of environmental services. However, many of these interfaces are 
incomplete and will need attention before the mechanisms become fully functional: 
A. Existing rules for hydro-electricity infrastructure do, depending on their origin 
and the multilateral or bilateral support for the initial investment, often have 
obligations to provide financial benefits to the local government and/or 
community. The ‘earmarking’ of these financial flows is often far from clear 
and transparent and in a number of cases funds have accumulated without 
proper ways for spending. Development of realistic, voluntary and conditional 
mechanisms for such situations where there in fact is a mandatory ‘buyer’ has 
the appearance of being a low-hanging fruit. 
B. Similarly, conservation funds have accumulated intended for support of local 
communities, but with little effective use. 
C. Countries such as Indonesia have over the years accumulated a large ‘refores-
tation’ fund based on levies on logging. Only gradually do governments learn 
that such funds can be used for realistic, voluntary and conditional activities 
by the local community, rather than for top-down planning of reforestation, 
with its well-documented low rate of success.  
At the interface of local and international stakeholders, national authorities need to 
ensure national autonomy. In the case of the Climate Convention, a Designated 
National Authority can set its own standards for what it considers to be sustainable 
development and its approval is needed for international deals. However, expe-
rience so far has been that the ‘transaction costs’ that derive from the complex 
approval procedures are a major obstacle in the development of effective mecha-
nisms, and substantially reduce the benefits that local actors (as opposed to con-
sultancy agents and intermediaries) can derive from the agreements (Box 1). 
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Box1. RUPES Kalahan  
 
Currently, there are two markets that the Kalahan Educational Foundation (KEF) is 
developing – the Kyoto and the non-Kyoto markets. The efforts they allotted since 
1970s to measure the biomass of their old growth forest are not wasted. With the 
improved formulas in quantifying their carbon stocks, results can be utilized to 
negotiate for the non-Kyoto markets.   
 
“The KEF began monitoring the growth of its forests. Its methods were not very 
accurate but they were helpful. When the RUPES consortium entered the picture and 
offered to help, we made contacts with one Carbon Expert at the University of the 
Philippines Los Banos (UPLB) and helped us to improve our computations to include 
branches and tops of the trees, not just the trunks. We discovered that we had 
underestimated the efficiency of the Ikalahan forests by at least 60%.” – Delbert Rice, 
KEF Director for Research 
 
In 2002, KEF estimated around 38,383 tons of carbon dioxide were recycled by their 
forests (KEF, 2003). To date, they are analyzing the 1994-2004 data using the 
improved formulas to quantify their carbon stocks. Also, forest inventory in the 62 
blocks (approx. 10,000ha) are being carried out. It is a huge task but they are 
confident that by the time they finish the project, they would able to compare the 
growth rates of three forest types (dipterocarp, pine and oak forests) and the carbon 
sequestration rates of 15 indigenous tree species.  
 
At the mean time, the RUPES Kalahan Team is preparing the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) - Project Design Document (PDD) for Kyoto Market. The 
Kalahan Forestry team with the technical assistance of ICRAF also prepared the 
“Forestry Project Idea Note (PIN) on Sequestration Project in the Ancestral Domain 
of Ikalahan.” The PIN proposes a carbon sequestration project in 900 hectares 
grassland portion of the Domain. Among the activities conducted was the field 
measurement of carbon stocks in the grassland areas, which was carried out by the 
Kalahan Forestry team. 
 
 They are working hard to achieve rewards from this environmental service. “The 
Ikalahans carry all of the burdens while the people in the lowlands receive all of the 
benefits” as exhorted by one local resident. 
 
“It seems that most of the needed legislation to enable the Ikalahan people to be 
remunerated for the forest services which they provide is already in place. The next 
step is to begin the dialogues with the beneficiaries of the forest services to convince 
them to pay for the services rendered,” as Rice pointed out.  
 
Though, monetary payments are not yet realized, however, KEF’s hard work is well 
recognized. With this RUPES project, it builds the capacity of indigenous 
communities to begin the negotiation. It will also increase awareness and participation 
in the carbon sequestration and other related issues in and around the ancestral domain 
communities through the public education programs. The KEF is looking forward that 
their efforts will be soon rewarded with the best rewards. 
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Figure 8. Interactions between the various types of capital that determine the performance of 
land use options at the local scale vis-à-vis multiple local requirements for goods and 
services, the flow of goods and services that reaches downstream markets and stake-
holders, and the national scale processes (a, b, c, d, e) that link local to national scale  
3.2 Cross-sectoral linkages, integrated rural development  
Experience in each of the RUPES sites has been that the communities receive a con-
fusing mix of positive and negative signals from national policies. On one hand these 
signals provide resources for the development of infrastructure, education and health 
services that can improve the quality of life in the rural setting, on the other hand the 
overall economy continues to pull people towards cities and/or jobs overseas. 
Complaints from lowland stakeholders over ‘deforestation’ and loss of environmental 
services as free ‘public goods’ tend to provide a negative image of the upland people, 
rather than a set of positive incentives for above-average efforts to enhance ES. 
Financial flows (‘payments for ES’) are unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to 
really shift the local land use agenda in cases, for example, where improved road 
access allows intensive vegetable or livestock production to emerge for which the 
uplands have a climatic advantage. In most cases the ES rewards will be a relatively 
small component in the overall incentive structure. 
4. Learning at site level 
4.1 Stages 
A primary step of the RUPES project has been the development of a shared percep-
tion between the project stakeholders of what rewards for ES entail (Figure 3). An 
early learning point also was recognition of the limitations of a pure ‘environmental 
economics’ science – policy paradigm, with a single currency expression of environ-
mental costs and benefits informing a supposedly benign central decision making 
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authority. In the language of boundary organizations, RUPES shifted from a ‘type II’ 
boundary organization, to a ‘type V’ boundary organization. Figure 3 and the com-
plexity it represents on the ‘ES modifier’ (potential ES seller) side has become a 
shared reality (‘boundary object’) between the RUPES partners. 
 In the emergence of location-specific reward mechanisms, the role of interme-
diaries (boundary organizations) can be differentiated in four stages: 
I. Scoping (K Ù K) 
II. Identifying stakeholders (A Ù A)  
III. Negotiations (K Ù K) Ù (AÙA), aiming for (unified K Ù unified A)  
IV. Implementation, monitoring and learning (unified K Ù unified A)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Stages recognized in the development of location-specific reward mechanisms for 
environmental services and the role of ‘intermediaries’ between upland modifiers/ provi-
ders of ES (who may become ‘sellers’) and downstream stakeholders/beneficiaries (who 
may become ‘buyers’) 
 
The site-level experience of RUPES has made clear that the main ‘currency’ of 
rewards for ES can vary from financial ones (‘PES’) to ones based on provision of 
public services (e.g. for health, education or transport), enhanced market- access (e.g. 
certification for niche markets) or tenure security. Where large numbers of upland 
poor are in conflict with the state and its regulations about land access, the provision 
of ‘conditional tenure security’ has been found to be particularly effective. 
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Figure 10. Representation of steps in bonding and bridging social capital formation as 
part of institutional conflict resolution and pre-cursors of effective conditional 
and voluntary ES reward mechanisms  
 
Where ‘secure tenure’ was originally seen as a pre-condition for effective rewards for 
environmental services (Fig 10), the RUPES experience has been that providing 
‘conditional tenure’ in itself can be an important ‘reward’ mechanisms, as well as 
being a step in conflict resolution and opening up new ways of engagement for upland 
communities. In a pure ‘indigenous’ context, tenure security is often seen as an 
‘unconditional’ right that simply needs to be recognized. In a context of more recent 
migration of people into uplands, a treatment of tenure security conditional to ES 
provision has been found to be effective in Indonesia, using legal options of 
‘community based forest management’.  
 
4.2 Rapid appraisal tools for the scoping stage 
 
As part of RUPES Phase 1 a number of ‘tools’ have been developed, especially for 
the scoping and stakeholder identification stage (addressing multiple ways of knowing 
as in Figure 11): 
RHA – rapid hydrological appraisal (Farida et al. 2005; Jeanes et al., 2006), 
RABA – rapid agrobiodiversity appraisal (Kuncoro et al., 2006),  
RaCSA – rapid carbon stock appraisal, 
RaTCA – rapid tenure claim appraisal. 
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Box 2. Rapid Hydrological Appraisal of Lake Singkarak watershed functions 
(Leimona et al., 2006) 
 
The rapid hydrological appraisal (Farida et al., 2005) analyzed perspectives of a range of 
stakeholders –local communities, researchers and policy makers. A topic that appeared to be 
controversial is the effect of planting Pinus merkusii or other fast growing evergreen tree species 
on the quantity of water supplied to the lake. Although these species were favoured by foresters 
for past ‘re-greening’ efforts, water user by canopy interception and transpiration of such trees 
reduces total water yield to the lake, and the expected increase in regularity of flow through 
better soil structure will not fully compensate this effect.  
 The hydrological model pointed to a strong dependence of HEP performance on 
variations in annual rainfall and possible increase of (El Nino) years with long dry seasons under 
the influence of global climate change. This effect exceeds that of local land cover change. The 
study pointed to the importance of maintaining water quality in the lake for all stakeholders, with 
concerns over sediment inflow, as well as nutrients and urban waste.  
 Reforestation effort using appropriate tree-species and focused on relevant ‘erosion hot-
spot’ locations can lower sediment influx to the lake and improve regularity of water flow. As 
part of these findings are surprising to some of the stakeholders, good communication is needed 
to avoid over-responses on perceptions that reforestation is either sacred or evil. It requires ‘the 
right tree on the right place’. 
 
Figure 11. Birds eye view of Lake Singkarak in the ‘rift valley’ in the middle of the Bukit 
Barisan mountain chain that runs along the island, the forested escarpment that 
separates the lake from the Indian Ocean on the left (W side), the grass covered hills 
on the E and W side of the lake and the rice paddies at lake level; while the natural 
outflow of the lake to the Ombilin river on the east side of the lake has been reduced 
to an ‘overflow’ channel, most of the water is now passed through a tunnel to a 
hydroelectric scheme (PLTA) to the west; The village of Paninggahan owns a coffee 
enclave in the natural forest zone 
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These tools aim to clarify locally relevant questions and suggest multiple ways to 
provide cost-effective answers to bridge between the multiple ways of knowing of 
local stakeholders, governance agencies and relevant scientific disciplines. Their 
design for ‘efficiency’ (e.g. the 6 month and 10 k$ time and cost design of RHA) is 
cognizant of the transaction cost issue. 
 
4.3 Multiple approaches to conditionality 
In the evolving mechanisms we can see different approaches to ‘conditionality’ (Fig 
13), that (by reference to Figure 2) relate to the different parts of the management 
cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Distinction between 5 possible levels at which the interaction between local 
agents and external stakeholders can take place; level I, exchanges on the basis of ‘ES 
produced’ represent a typical ‘market-based’ paradigm of buyers and sellers, while 
interactions at level IV represent ‘adaptive co-management’ 
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Where the methods used for evaluation have themselves been part of the negotiation 
process, such as in the case of the conditional tenure for community based forest 
management in the Sumberjaya test site, emphasis has been on administrative 
compliance rather than on actual provision of measurable environmental services. The 
current experiment with ‘river care’ payments on the basis of sediment measurements 
in streams is an attempt to provide experience with a level 1 type conditionality. 
 
Overall, the experience so far suggests that a mixed approach to conditionality is 
needed: the mechanisms need to provide for the opportunity costs of labour at 
‘activity’ level (III), be imbedded in local resource management plans (level IV) and 
use a mix of condition of the system (II) and actual services (I) where possible. 
Mechanisms fully based on ‘trust’ (V) (“indigenous people know best”) have been 
proposed, but are not viable without admixture of the other levels.  
 
4.4 Boundary objects and boundary work 
An articulation of the four stages (scoping, stakeholder identification, negotiation and 
implementation/monitoring) as ‘boundary work’ suggests a focus on the ‘boundary 
objects’ and ‘boundary work’ that can help more the process forward (Tables 1 and 
2). Reducing transaction costs may be possible if the transformational ‘experience’ of 
the initial RUPES sites is used to identify critical ‘services’ with emergence of a cadre 
of qualified, demand driven ‘service providers’, and a set of concrete ‘boundary 
objects’ that can serve as ‘commodities’ with set quality characteristics as yardsticks 
and drivers of further innovation and cost reduction. 
 
Table 1. Typical ‘boundary objects’ for the 4 stages of ES reward mechanisms  
 
Scoping:  KÙ K 
Words (articulation of existing land use 
and effects on products and services, 
such as ‘kebun lindung’ or ‘shifting 
forestry’) 
Icons/images 
Maps of space and lateral flows 
Representation of historical roots of the 
present situation 
Explanatory models used by various sta-
keholders for local system dynamics 
Stakeholder identification: AÙA 
Stakeholder typology based on concerns 
and preferences 
Maps of ‘rights and resources’ 
Negotiation table (‘neutral’) 
Workable bounds in the tradeoff between 
an ‘all stakeholder’ paradigm, leakage 
(‘external impacts’) concerns and 
transaction cost 
Negotiation: (K Ù K) Ù (AÙA), aiming for (unified K Ù unified A) 
Tradeoff matrix as ‘agreement to disagree’ and baseline of current ES provision 
Scenario analysis based on all major stakeholder concerns and plausible change 
Assessments of additionality, leakage and permanence 
Project Design Document (PDD) in the Clean Development Mechanism cycle 
New use of existing legal opportunities for ‘community based forest management’ 
Standards of service delivery respecting multiple ‘ways of knowing’ 
Contracts: conditional service delivery agreements with realistic rewards and 
voluntary ‘buy in’ 
Implementation, Monitoring and Learning: unified K Ù unified A (or reverting 
to (K Ù K) Ù (AÙA) 
Operational indicators for monitoring aligned with the main criteria for success 
Certificates of compliance to agreed standards 
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Table 2. Typical ‘boundary work’ carried out in the 4 stages of ES reward 
mechanisms in RUPES sites 
4.5 Pathways to poverty reduction 
Positive effects of RES on poverty reduction may derive from a number of different 
pathways. Eight have been recognized so far in the RUPES program (Table 3). They 
address different dimensions of (rural) poverty. 
 
Table 3. Pathways for ES Reward schemes to alleviate poverty as recognized in the 
RUPES program 
Scoping;  KÙ K 
Participatory landscape analysis to ap-
praise the logical relations perceived 
Reconstruction of recent history of land 
use and its socio-ecological impacts 
Local land use options and tradeoffs 
Mapping of terrain and boundaries of 
jurisdiction and applicable rules 
Rapid Hydrological/ Agrobiodiversity/ 
Carbon stock/ Tenure Claim appraisal 
Develop local monitoring tools & skills 
Stakeholder identification; AÙA 
Trust/confidence  building 
Support key individuals with (potential) 
leadership roles in local organization 
Presence at site level to be ‘on call’ for 
events initiated by stakeholders 
Transparent handling of resources 
Enhancement of negotiation and 
mediation skills 
Nomination for environmental/social 
reward (recognition) 
Negotiation; (K Ù K) Ù (AÙA), aiming for (unified K Ù unified A) 
Formalize plans in Project Design Document (PDD) for participation in C market 
Negotiate contacts under Community Based Forest Management rules 
Auctions of contracts for improving watershed services 
Auctions of contracts for conserving (agro)biodiversity 
Implementation, Monitoring and Learning, unified K Ù unified A (or reverting 
to (K Ù K) Ù (AÙA) 
Monitoring protocols for the key environmental service of interest (I) 
Monitoring protocols for land cover as proxy for environmental service provision (II)  
Compliance monitoring tools at ‘activity’ levels (III) 
Compliance monitoring tools at community scale ‘resource use planning’ level (IV) 
 Pathway 
 
Poverty dimension 
addressed 
P1 Stop negative 'drivers' that enhance poverty and degrade environmental services ('PUPES') 
Assets, Risk, Health, 
Indirect income 
P2 
Enhance local environmental services and resources 
(e.g. regular supply of clean water, access to beneficial 
plant and animal resources) Health, Assets 
P3 
Enhanced security of tenure, reduced fear of eviction 
or 'take-over' by outsiders, allowing investment in 
land resources; increased asset value 
Assets, Risk, Indirect 
income 
P4 Enhanced trust with (local) government, increased 'say' in development decisions 
Empowerment, Reduced 
informal taxes (corruption)
P5 Increased access to public services (health, education, accessibility, security) 
Health, Education, 
Indirect income 
P6 Payment for labour invested at a rate at least equal to opportunity cost of labour 
Direct income (labour 
based) 
P7 Increased access to investment funds (micro credit or otherwise) for potentially profitable activities Indirect income 
P8 Entrepreneurism in selling 'commoditized' environmental services Direct income (land based)
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4.6 Learning for new sites  
At the start of the RUPES project, a hypothetical ‘level of preparedness’ was discus-
sed and the target was to first work with and learn from sites where ES reward mecha-
nisms already exist or where about to ‘break through’, to provide ‘living laboratories’ 
for other sites (Fig. 13). In fact, most of the sites selected where probably a few more 
steps away from effective reward mechanisms than the target was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Conceptual progression of ‘levels of preparedness’ for effective, efficient, 
sustainable and fair ES reward mechanisms as initially perceived by RUPES and as 
re-interpreted based on the 4 dimensions (realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-
poor) 
 
In the process of selecting the 6 action research sites, we learned a lot about many 
other situations and communities who are lower on the curve. We also learned that the 
overall ‘level of preparedness’ is at least a 4-dimensional problem of being ‘realistic, 
voluntary, conditional and pro-poor’. The least articulated dimension probably 
constrains the overall level of preparedness. 
 
5. Next steps for RUPES? 
In initial RUPES project design the idea was to explore and set up a ‘broker’ institu-
tion at the end of the project phase, which would play a market-based role to match 
supply of environmental services (ES) by up-land communities and demand by 
international/national stakeholders. In the RUPES project implementation phase the 
idea of a broker institution along the lines initially envisaged was found to be pre-
mature, and the RUPES International Steering Committee as well as IFAD as 
investor, agreed to take it out from the log frame and project deliverables. 
  
Now, in the last year of the IFAD project, however, it may be time to revert to the 
issue and capture all lessons learnt so far into the creation of RUPES as a ‘boundary 
organization’, operating at the international/continental scale (-- in 2005 the RUPES 
ISC agreed that we call ourselves RUPES-Asia to create space for a RUPES-Africa 
and other ‘siblings’ --) that facilitates the international and regional (e.g. ASEAN) 
learning and that facilitates national level RUPES boundary organizations (with 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam as obvious candidates for an initial round) that 
deal with the national regulatory aspects and institutional learning, and facilitates the 
emergence, initial growth and independence of ‘site-level’ RUPES boundary 
organizations that negotiate and help implement and monitor realistic, voluntary and 
conditional ES reward schemes that are designed to be pro-poor. 
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Figure 15. Nested structure of site-level boundary organizations (such as RUPES-Singkarak 
and RUPES-Bakun), national boundary organizations (such as the RUPES-Indonesia 
COMMITTEES and RUPES-Philippines) and the RUPES-Asia boundary organization 
 
In stead of a single-level ‘ES reward broker’ as originally envisaged for RUPES, we 
can now see the emergence of a 3-tiered boundary organization (Fig. 14), that crosses 
boundaries between multiple actors and multiple ways of knowing at site, national and 
international level. 
 
Table 4. Steps needed to clarify function and structure of such a potential RUPES 
boundary organization 
Function Structure 
Site level 
Crystallization point in the initial, fluid 
scoping and stakeholder identification 
stage, establishing a role as ‘independent’ 
and ‘mutually trustable’ agent of salient, 
credible and legitimate knowledge 
products relevant for local action 
Institutionalizing of site-level boundary 
organization of local stakeholders (with 
participation of local knowledge brokers) 
after scoping and stakeholder identifi-
cation stage, to facilitate negotiations and 
to provide oversight and primary liti-
gation forum in the implementation  stage 
National 
N1. National level learning from expe-
rience, bottlenecks and opportunities 
on the environment*poverty nexus 
N2. National policy advise to facilitate 
evolution of conduce policy 
environment and locally applicable 
performance standards 
N3. Development of cadre of ‘honest 
brokers’ for the various stages of 
effective reward mechanisms 
N4. Stimulation of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ involvement and 
voluntary buyers/investors 
N5. Network of site-level actors and 
 
Institutionalizing of national scale  
boundary organization of ‘knowledge 
and action’ stakeholders on the poverty * 
environment  nexus 
 
Institutional representation of site-level 
boundary organizations and national 
institutions (GO, NARS, Universities 
NGO’s and private sector) or qualified/ 
respected individuals with renewable 
tenure? 
 
Secretariat and convener functions 
National policy development
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intermediaries for enhanced learning 
International 
I1. Contextualized, shared learning 
I2. Evolution of methods and perfor-
mance standards 
I3. Advise and feedback to evolving 
international policies 
Institutional representation of national 
nodes plus international actors on the 
knowledge and action side of develop-
ment/ poverty and environment  
 
Secretariat and convener functions 
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